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Calling a Spade a Spade: Understanding Sex Offender 
Registration as Punishment and Implications Post-Starkey 
I. Introduction 
Imagine George, an affable college freshman and newly minted 
fraternity pledge. As part of his initiation ritual, George’s brothers require 
him to take a leisurely stroll down the university quad and sorority row—
naked. Consequently, campus police arrest George, and a zealous local 
prosecutor charges him with indecent exposure under state law, which, 
unbeknownst to George, requires him to register as a sex offender if 
convicted.1 After his conviction, George is required to register for ten 
years.2 As part of his registration duties, George may not live near a school, 
park, or playground. He must report his whereabouts to local law 
enforcement regularly, and his driver’s license bears the label “sex 
offender.” Shortly after George’s conviction, the legislature extends the 
period in which he must register from ten to twenty years.  
Some might balk at the propriety of criminalizing George’s seemingly 
innocuous activity. Notwithstanding the reasonableness of anti-streaking 
policies or sex offender laws generally, many would agree that doubling 
George’s registration period after his conviction appears manifestly unfair.3 
However, prior to the Oklahoma Supreme Court’s ruling in Starkey v. 
Oklahoma Department of Corrections, such an outcome was permissible in 
                                                                                                                 
 1. Although such a prosecution might seem improbable, it is not without precedent. 
Consider, for example, the now defunct Naked Pumpkin Run in Boulder, Colorado, an annual 
Halloween tradition that featured hundreds of nighttime runners wearing only pumpkins atop 
their heads. In 2008, police arrested twelve Pumpkin Run participants under state indecent 
exposure laws that carry substantial penalties, including the possibility of sex offender 
registration. Vanessa Miller, Boulder Police Ready, with Less Severe Penalties, for Naked 
Pumpkin Run, COLORADO DAILY (Oct. 1, 2010), http://www.coloradodaily.com/ci_162 
31119?source%253Dmost_viewed.20F88DA3D7D369F5BB70F372987EAE1F.html#. Those 
arrested ultimately avoided sex offender status, but only after fighting authorities in court. Id.  
 2. In Oklahoma, George’s fate would likely turn on whether the State could prove he 
had a “lewd” or “lascivious” intent. See McKinley v. State, 1926 OK CR 123, ¶¶ 4-5, 244 P. 
208, 208 (finding indecent exposure conviction requires “more than a negligent disregard of 
the decent proprieties and consideration due to others”). 
 3. In offering the above hypothetical, the author does not intend to trivialize the 
majority of sex offenses or demean the profound harm they inflict upon victims and society. 
George’s scenario highlights the broad sweep of today’s sex offender laws and how legal 
analysis of these laws should be based on dispassionate reason, not the strong emotional 
responses that certain sex crimes immediately (and justifiably) evoke.  
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Oklahoma.4 The Starkey court declared retroactive amendments to the 
state’s sex offender laws violated the Oklahoma Constitution’s prohibition 
on ex post facto laws.5 
This Note analyzes the rationale of the Starkey decision and its 
implications for sex offender legislation in Oklahoma. This Note argues 
that the Starkey ruling opens the door to Eighth Amendment challenges to 
sex offender laws, particularly for juvenile sex offenders. It also argues that 
the ruling provides an opportunity for lawmakers to enact more sensible sex 
offender regulations, and that it offers a model for other states with similar 
legislation to emulate. Part II reviews the legal history of the Ex Post Facto 
Clause and related jurisprudence. Parts III and IV discuss the background of 
the Starkey decision and the court’s rationale. Part V analyzes the 
immediate and long-term implications of the decision.   
II. The History of the Ex Post Facto Clause and the Legal Backdrop of the 
Starkey Decision  
A. U.S. Supreme Court’s Ex Post Facto Jurisprudence 
 This Section discusses the history of the Supreme Court’s ex post 
facto jurisprudence, specifically the distinction the Court has drawn 
between punishment and civil regulatory measures. This Section then 
discusses how a majority of states have adopted the Court’s position that 
sex offender legislation is not punishment and therefore does not implicate 
the Ex Post Facto Clause. Finally, this Section explores how Oklahoma’s ex 
post facto jurisprudence mirrored that of the Court prior to the Starkey 
decision.  
1. Origins and Early Application 
The Supreme Court first defined the scope and meaning of the 
Constitution’s Ex Post Facto Clause in Calder v. Bull.6 An ex post facto 
law is any law that (1) punishes an action that, when committed, was 
lawful; (2) makes a crime more severe than it was when committed; (3) 
changes or increases the punishment retroactively; or (4) alters the rules of 
evidence from those in effect when the offense was committed.7   
The Ex Post Facto Clause addresses particular concerns raised by 
retroactive legislation. Writing for the Court in Landgraf v. USI Film 
                                                                                                                 
 4. Starkey v. Okla. Dep’t of Corr., 2013 OK 43, 305 P.3d 1004. 
 5. Id. ¶ 79, 305 P.3d at 1030. 
 6. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 390-91 (1798).   
 7. Id. at 390.  
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Products, Justice Stevens explained that legislatures have “unmatched 
powers” to “sweep away settled expectations suddenly and without 
individualized consideration.”8 Because legislative bodies are responsive to 
political pressures, they “may be tempted to use retroactive legislation as a 
means of retribution against unpopular groups or individuals.”9 To prevent 
“arbitrary and potentially vindictive legislation,” the Ex Post Facto Clause 
restricts the government’s power to legislate after the fact.10  
In fleshing out the Ex Post Facto Clause’s protective purpose, the 
Court’s early jurisprudence helped clarify the clause’s reach. However, 
these early opinions also raised a pivotal question: What laws, if any, fall 
outside the ambit of the clause’s blanket prohibition? 
2. Defining “Punishment”: Punitive vs. Regulatory Laws  
Beginning with several cases in the late 1800s, the Supreme Court 
started to define the scope of the Ex Post Facto Clause. The Court drew a 
distinction between laws that inflict additional penalties on individuals for 
past acts and laws that impose restrictions incidental to the exercise of the 
State’s regulatory power.11 For example, the Court held that state laws 
disqualifying convicted felons from practicing medicine or law do not 
violate the ex post facto prohibition because these laws fall within the 
State’s power to protect the public by establishing minimum standards of 
competency and character for certain professions.12 Under this rubric, the 
past offense merely evidences the individual’s dubious scruples and 
propensity for future misconduct.13 Whether a legislative act is punitive or 
regulatory is frequently the deciding question in ex post facto challenges 
and often “extremely difficult and elusive” for courts to determine.14 
In drawing the line between punitive and regulatory laws, the Supreme 
Court has adopted the two-part intent-effects test.15 A court should first 
consider whether lawmakers manifested either an express or implied intent 
                                                                                                                 
 8. 511 U.S. 244, 266-67 (1994) (discussing the history of the Court’s Ex Post Facto 
jurisprudence). 
 9. Id. at 266.  
 10. Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 28-29 (1981) (citations omitted). 
 11. See, e.g., Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189, 191-92 (1898); Dent v. West 
Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 121-22 (1889).  
 12. Hawker, 170 U.S. at 191-92.  
 13. Id. at 198.  
 14. See De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144, 160 (1960); see also Kennedy v. Mendoza-
Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168 (1963).  
 15. United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1980). 
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for the act to be punitive or regulatory.16 If the legislative intent is to inflict 
punishment, the analysis ends and the act is deemed punitive.17 If the 
legislative intent is nonpunitive or ambiguous, courts consider whether the 
law is so punitive in purpose or effect to overcome any manifest intent to 
the contrary.18 Where it is clear the legislature intended to create a 
regulatory scheme, the burden is on the challenger to show by “clearest 
proof” that the statute’s punitive effects outweigh the nonpunitive intent.19 
In Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, the Court set forth seven factors to 
consider in analyzing the purpose and effect of a legislative act, including: 
(1) whether the law imposes an “affirmative disability or restraint;”20 (2) 
whether it has historically been regarded as punishment;21 (3) whether its 
application requires a finding of scienter;22 (4) “whether it promotes the 
traditional aims of punishment—retribution and deterrence;”23 (5) whether 
it applies to conduct that is already a crime;24 (6) whether it can advance a 
legitimate, nonpunitive purpose;25 and (7) whether it appears “excessive” in 
relation to the nonpunitive purpose.26 Because the Mendoza-Martinez 
factors are applicable in multiple constitutional contexts,27 they are “neither 
exhaustive nor dispositive . . . but are useful guideposts.”28  
  
                                                                                                                 
 16. Id. at 248. 
 17. Id. at 248-49 (noting the Court analyzes the act’s purpose and effects only if the 
legislative intent is nonpunitive). 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. at 249.  
 20. 372 U.S. 144, 168 (1963).  
 21. Id.  
 22. Id. Scienter is a mental state in which one has knowledge that one’s action, 
statement, etc., is wrong, deceptive, or illegal: often used as a standard of guilt. BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY 1463 (9th ed. 2009). 
 23. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 168.  
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at 168-69.  
 26. Id. at 169.  
 27. Whether an act is punitive or regulatory is relevant for several constitutional 
challenges, including cruel and unusual punishment. See infra Part V.B.  
 28. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 97 (2003) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 
Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 99 (1997); United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 249 
(1980)).  
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3. Upholding Retroactive Sex Offender Laws as Civil Regulatory 
Schemes 
The Court first applied the intent-effects test and the Mendoza-Martinez 
factors to a state sex offender law in Kansas v. Hendricks.29 In 1994, the 
Kansas legislature passed the Kansas Offender Registration Act (Kansas 
Act), which permitted the indefinite involuntary commitment of “sexually 
violent predators,” defined as persons convicted or charged with sexually 
violent offenses and who suffered from a “mental abnormality” or 
“personality disorder” that made them likely to commit “predatory acts of 
sexual violence.”30 The petitioner, Hendricks, was incarcerated for sexually 
molesting children and was slated for release from prison shortly after the 
legislation’s passage.31 After the state used the Kansas Act to commit 
Hendricks indefinitely, he challenged the law on ex post facto grounds.32  
Reversing the Kansas Supreme Court’s decision invalidating the Kansas 
Act, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the civil commitment law was 
nonpunitive.33 This removed an “essential prerequisite” for Hendricks’ ex 
post facto claim.34 After conducting the first step of the inquiry and 
concluding the manifest intent behind the law was nonpunitive, the Court 
considered the Kansas Act’s effects.35 Applying several of the Mendoza-
Martinez factors, the Court noted that, although the law clearly imposed an 
“affirmative restraint,” detention was not dispositive, and the law was 
consistent with the historically recognized practice of confining the 
“dangerously mentally ill.”36 Additionally, the commitment law did not 
promote either retribution or deterrence.37 The Kansas Act did not advance 
retribution because it did not assign blame for past criminal conduct; 
instead it used such conduct as evidence of “future dangerousness.”38 The 
fact that a finding of scienter, or criminal intent, was not required to commit 
an individual under the Act also indicated the legislation was not 
                                                                                                                 
 29. 521 U.S. 346, 361-63 (1997).  
 30. Id. at 350-52.  
 31. Id. at 350.  
 32. Id. Hendricks also challenged his commitment on substantive due process and 
double jeopardy grounds. Id.  
 33. Id. at 368-69. 
 34. Id. at 369.   
 35. Id. at 361-62. 
 36. Id. at 362-63. 
 37. Id. at 361-62. 
 38. Id. at 362.  
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retributive.39 Likewise, the law did not promote deterrence because it 
applied to individuals who, because of a mental abnormality or personality 
disorder, could not control their sexually violent impulses and were 
therefore undeterred by the prospect of confinement.40 Because the 
legislature’s nonpunitive intent outweighed the act’s punitive effects, the 
Court concluded the law did not impose punishment.41 
In Smith v. Doe, the Court again rejected an ex post facto challenge to a 
state sex offender law, this time upholding Alaska’s Sex Offender 
Registration and Notification Act (Alaska Act).42 Passed in 1994, the 
Alaska Act required sex offenders to register with the state and provide a 
variety of information, including: their name, aliases, identifying features, 
address, place of employment, date of birth, conviction information, 
driver’s license number, vehicle information, and post-conviction treatment 
history.43 The law required offenders convicted of a single, nonaggravated 
offense to update and verify this information every year for fifteen years.44 
Sex offenders convicted of multiple sex offenses or aggravated offenses, 
such as those involving children, were required to verify their information 
every three months for life.45 Pursuant to the law, the Alaska Department of 
Public Safety maintained a database of sex offender information, including 
photographs of offenders, which the state made available to the public.46  
Finding the registration and notification provisions of the law were 
retroactive, the Court held that the provisions applied to sex offenders 
convicted prior to the law’s passage.47 Two sex offenders convicted of 
sexually abusing minors before the Act’s passage challenged the law on ex 
post facto grounds.48 The United States District Court for the District of 
Alaska granted the offenders summary judgment, and the Ninth Circuit 
affirmed.49  
The Supreme Court reversed, holding the Alaska Act was nonpunitive 
and therefore could not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.50 Writing for the 
                                                                                                                 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 362-63. 
 41. See id. at 368-69. 
 42. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 105-06 (2003).  
 43. Id. at 89-90. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 90. 
 46. Id. at 90-91. 
 47. Id. at 90. 
 48. Id. at 91. 
 49. Id. at 91-92. 
 50. Id. at 105-06. 
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majority, Justice Kennedy affirmed the lower courts’ finding that the 
Alaska Legislature’s intent was to create a “civil, nonpunitive regime.”51 
Analyzing the effects of the law, Kennedy focused on the “most relevant” 
of the Mendoza-Martinez factors: (1) whether sex offender registration has 
been historically regarded as punishment; (2) whether it “imposes an 
affirmative disability or restraint . . . [; (3) whether it] promotes the 
traditional aims of punishment . . . [; (4) whether it] has a rational 
connection to a nonpunitive purpose . . . [; and (5) whether it] is excessive 
with respect to this [nonpunitive] purpose.”52  
The Smith majority held that public dissemination of sex offender 
information was a relatively recent development and did not resemble 
colonial forms of punishment, such as shaming or branding.53 The 
registration requirement did not impose an affirmative disability or restraint 
because it did not restrict an offender’s ability to move residences or change 
jobs, and was distinguishable from supervised release or probation.54 
Further, registration did not promote the traditional aims of punishment; 
although registration had a deterrent effect, this was true of virtually all 
regulatory schemes.55 The registration requirement did not promote 
retribution because, while the registration requirement was linked to prior 
criminal activity, the offense was evidence of the offender’s present 
dangerousness.56 Finally, the law advanced the nonpunitive purpose of 
alerting the public of dangerous sex offenders in the community.57 The 
registration requirement reasonably advanced this nonpunitive purpose and 
was not excessive given the “frightening and high” rate of sex offender 
recidivism.58 For these reasons, the Court determined the law was 
nonpunitive and retroactive application of the registration requirement did 
not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.59 
Dissenting, Justice Stevens argued the law failed the Court’s two-
pronged ex post facto analysis.60 Stevens looked to the act’s purpose and 
                                                                                                                 
 51. Id. at 96. 
 52. Id. at 97. 
 53. Id. at 97-99. 
 54. Id. at 100-02. 
 55. Id. at 102. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 102-03. 
 58. Id. at 102 (citing McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 34 (2002)). Studies have largely 
debunked the notion that sex offenders pose a high threat of recidivism. See infra note 208 
and accompanying text.  
 59. Smith, 538 U.S. at 105-06. 
 60. Id. at 110-14 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2015
330 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67:323 
 
 
effects, which he determined were punitive in nature.61 Registration and 
public dissemination of sex offender information imposed “significant 
affirmative obligations” and severely stigmatized offenders.62 Moreover, 
the law applied to all individuals convicted of sex offenses and only to 
those individuals.63 Unlike other instances where the Court had upheld civil 
sanctions for past criminal activity (e.g., statutes disqualifying felons from 
certain vocations), a prior criminal conviction was a “sufficient and . . . 
necessary condition for the sanction.”64 Because the statute “severely 
impairs [an offender’s] liberty,” Stevens wrote, retroactive application of 
the statute imposed punishment proscribed by the Ex Post Facto Clause.65 
Also dissenting, Justices Ginsburg and Breyer found the Alaska Act 
ultimately failed the effects prong of the test because it was “excessive[] in 
relation to its nonpunitive objective.66 The statute was overinclusive 
because it applied with equal force to all sex offenders regardless of the 
danger the individual offender posed to the community.67 The statute made 
no provision for “rehabilitation or . . . physical incapacitation.”68 As such, 
offenders who could prove they posed no threat of recidivism could not 
relieve themselves of their reporting obligations.69  
Additionally, Ginsburg and Breyer doubted the nonpunitive intent of the 
Alaska Legislature.70 They echoed Justice Souter’s concurring opinion in 
which he observed, “when a legislature uses prior convictions to impose 
burdens that outpace the law's stated civil aims, there is room for serious 
argument that the ulterior purpose is to revisit past crimes, not prevent 
future ones.”71  
Ultimately, the dissent’s concerns notwithstanding, the Court determined 
sex offender registration laws were nonpunitive.  
B. Oklahoma’s Ex Post Facto Jurisprudence Pre-Starkey  
Prior to the decision in Starkey, Oklahoma’s ex post facto jurisprudence 
regarding sex offender registration laws reflected the Supreme Court’s 
                                                                                                                 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 111.  
 63. Id. at 113.  
 64. Id. at 112.  
 65. Id. at 113-14.  
 66. Id. at 116 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  
 67. Id.  
 68. Id. at 117. 
 69. Id.  
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 109 (Souter, J., concurring). 
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holding in Smith.72 In Freeman v. Henry, the Oklahoma Court of Civil 
Appeals rejected an ex post facto challenge to the state’s registration act.73 
The plaintiff in Freeman was convicted of sex offenses in 1982 and 1985, 
prior to passage of the State Registration Act.74 He argued retroactive 
application of the statute violated the prohibitions against ex post facto laws 
in the United States and Oklahoma Constitutions.75 Citing Smith, the Court 
of Civil Appeals found the registration act was a “civil regulatory scheme 
which [did] not violate the ex post facto proscriptions of either the United 
States or Oklahoma Constitutions.”76 Accordingly, the court affirmed the 
trial court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s claim.77 
The Court of Civil Appeals heard a similar challenge to the registration 
act a year later in Reimers v. State ex rel. Department of Corrections.78 The 
plaintiff in Reimers had previously pled guilty to indecent exposure and 
received a five-year suspended sentence.79 After completing his sentence in 
1997, the plaintiff registered as a sex offender for two years, as required by 
the law in effect at the time.80 Subsequent amendments to the statute greatly 
increased the registration period and imposed restrictions on where 
convicted sex offenders, such as the plaintiff, could live.81 The plaintiff 
argued the amendments were unconstitutional, as applied to him, on ex post 
facto grounds.82 Avoiding the broader constitutional issue, the court 
“recast” the plaintiff’s argument, finding the legislature did not intend the 
amendments to apply retroactively and ordering the Department of 
Corrections (DOC) to remove the plaintiff from the registry.83 In so doing, 
the Reimers court effectively punted on the underlying constitutional 
question.  
                                                                                                                 
 72. See Freeman v. Henry, 2010 OK CIV APP 134, 245 P.3d 1258.  
 73. Id. ¶ 11, 245 P.3d at 1259.  
 74. Id. ¶ 2, 245 P.3d at 1259.  
 75. Id. ¶ 4, 245 P.3d at 1259. The U.S. Constitution states that “[n]o Bill of Attainder or 
ex post facto Law shall be passed.” U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 3. Similarly, the Oklahoma 
Constitution states that “[n]o bill of attainder, ex post facto law, nor any law impairing the 
obligation of contracts, shall ever be passed.” OKLA. CONST. art. 2, § 15.  
 76. Freeman, ¶¶ 10-11, 245 P.3d at 1260 (finding the registration act did not impose an 
“affirmative restraint”). 
 77. Id. ¶ 11, 245 P.3d at 1260. 
 78. 2011 OK CIV APP 83, 257 P.3d 416.  
 79. Id. ¶ 7, 257 P.3d at 418. 
 80. Id. ¶¶ 8-9, 257 P.3d at 418. 
 81. Id. ¶¶ 10-11, 257 P.3d at 418. 
 82. Id. ¶ 17, 257 P.3d at 419.  
 83. Id. ¶¶ 29, 32-33, 257 P.3d at 420-21.  
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As the Freeman decision demonstrates, Oklahoma’s pre-Starkey sex 
offender jurisprudence tracked closely with that of the United States 
Supreme Court in Smith. Oklahoma courts rejected ex post facto challenges 
to the state’s registration act based on a finding that the act was 
nonpunitive, and therefore, retroactive application of the statute was 
permissible.84 
C. Other States’ Jurisprudence Regarding Sex Offenders and Ex Post Facto 
Challenges 
Similar to Oklahoma courts, most state courts have rejected ex post facto 
challenges to sex offender registration laws, finding such laws nonpunitive 
in nature.85 Many of these courts cite Smith approvingly as the touchstone 
for analyzing the constitutionality of sex offender legislation.86 Such courts 
tend to emphasize the nonpunitive public safety interest behind registration 
laws and how provisions, such as residency restrictions, reasonably advance 
this nonpunitive interest.87 Likewise, on the federal level, appellate courts 
are unanimous in toeing the Smith line.88 Indeed, since the Supreme Court 
reversed the Ninth Circuit in Smith, no federal court of appeals has upheld 
an ex post facto challenge to sex offender registration laws.89 Armed with 
the Smith decision and its reasoning, a majority of state and federal courts 
have dismissed ex post facto claims. 
Nevertheless, a small but growing number of states have broken from 
this consensus. State courts in Alaska, Indiana, Kentucky, Maine, 
Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and Ohio have all declared the 
retroactive application of such amendments unconstitutional.90 
                                                                                                                 
 84. Freeman v. Henry, 2010 OK CIV APP 134, ¶¶ 10-11, 245 P.3d 1258, 1260. 
 85. See, e.g., In re Justin B., 747 S.E.2d 774, 783 (S.C. 2013) (ruling that electronic 
monitoring of convicted sex offenders was nonpunitive as it was part of state’s civil 
regulatory scheme); Crawford v. State, 92 So. 3d 168, 179 (Ala. Crim. App. 2011) (finding 
the retroactive application of residency restriction was not punitive).  
 86. See, e.g., In re Justin B., 747 S.E.2d at 783; Crawford, 92 So. 3d at 179. 
 87. E.g., City of S. Milwaukee v. Kester, 2013 WI App 50, ¶ 30, 830 N.W.2d 710, 720-
21 (finding the city “did not have to enact the best measure to reach its aims, only a 
reasonable one”).  
 88. United States v. Felts, 674 F.3d 599, 605-06 (6th Cir. 2012) (noting “unanimous 
consensus among the circuits that SORNA does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause”). 
 89. Id. (internal citations omitted). But see United States v. Juvenile Male, 590 F.3d 924 
(9th Cir. 2009) (holding retroactive application of federal registration law to juvenile sex 
offenders violated Ex Post Facto Clause) vacated on mootness grounds, 131 S.Ct. 2860 
(2011). 
 90. Doe v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety & Corr. Servs., 62 A.3d 123, 143 (Md. 2013); Riley v. 
N.J. State Parole Bd., 32 A.3d 190, 197-98 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2011); Wallace v. 
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Additionally, an appellate court in California found an amendment to the 
state registration law imposing a residency restriction was punitive, though 
that case is pending review by the California Supreme Court.91 In 
overturning these laws, several courts have focused on the seventh 
Mendoza-Martinez factor—“whether . . . [the statute] appears ‘excessive’ in 
relation to the [nonpunitive purpose].”92 For these courts, the absence of 
individualized risk assessment (i.e., a method of distinguishing between 
offenders based on the threat they pose) is an important factor that tends to 
render retroactive operation of sex offender laws excessive.93 Other courts 
have emphasized the first Mendoza-Martinez factor—affirmative disability 
or restraint—and have found measures such as electronic monitoring and 
residency restrictions impose substantial limitations on an offender’s 
freedom of movement.94 Still others have focused on the second Mendoza-
Martinez factor—similarity to traditional forms of punishment—and have 
found aspects of sex offender laws resemble traditional punishments such 
as banishment or shaming.95 
Courts upholding ex post facto challenges have dealt with the Smith 
decision differently. Some have tried to distinguish the Court’s holding in 
Smith, avoiding direct conflict with the decision. For example, the New 
Jersey Court of Appeals in Riley v. New Jersey State Parole Board found 
the adverse effects from the state’s electronic monitoring law were 
“substantially more severe” than the effects of “the registration and 
notification provisions of Megan's Law [that] the Court upheld in Smith.”96 
The New Jersey court noted that electronic monitoring entailed constant 
supervision of the sex offender’s movements, which was not true of the 
registration and notification provisions at issue in Smith.97  
However, other courts have taken a different tack. Instead of basing their 
rulings on a violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause of the federal 
                                                                                                                 
State, 905 N.E.2d 371, 384 (Ind. 2009); Commonwealth v. Baker, 295 S.W.3d 437, 447 (Ky. 
2009); State v. Letalien, 2009 ME 130, ¶ 63, 985 A.2d 4, 26; Commonwealth v. Cory, 911 
N.E.2d 187, 197 (Mass. 2009); State v. Strickland, 2009-Ohio-5424, No. 2008-L-034, 2009 
WL 3255305, at **8-9; Doe v. State, 189 P.3d 999, 1006-1019 (Ala. 2008).  
 91. People v. Mosley, 116 Cal. Rptr. 3d 321, 337-38 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010), cert. granted, 
247 P.3d 515 (Cal. 2011). 
 92. E.g., Wallace, 905 N.E.2d at 383 (citations omitted). 
 93. Id. (“Of course if the registration and disclosure are not tied to a finding that the 
safety of the public is threatened, there is an implication that the Act is excessive.”). 
 94. E.g., Riley, 32 A.3d at 199; Baker, 295 S.W.3d at 446-47. 
 95. Doe, 62 A.3d at 140-42; Baker, 295 S.W.3d at 444-45. 
 96. Riley, 32 A.3d at 199. 
 97. Id. at 199-200.  
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constitution, these courts have relied on similarly worded prohibitions in 
their respective state constitutions, thereby striking down retroactive 
amendments to sex offender legislation on state-law grounds.98 The Alaska 
Supreme Court was among the first to take this approach after the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Smith.99 Indiana and Maryland have followed suit.100 
This approach is effective because Smith is only binding precedent as to the 
federal Ex Post Facto Clause; it is not controlling on similar state 
prohibitions, even if they are identical in verbiage.101 State courts using this 
approach have found the federal constitution establishes minimum 
protections, which states may increase.102 For instance, the Maryland 
Supreme Court has adopted a more robust ex post facto prohibition while 
expressly acknowledging the U.S. Supreme Court has narrowed the scope 
of the federal Ex Post Facto Clause.103  
Although an increasing number of states have found aspects of state sex 
offender laws unconstitutional on ex post facto grounds, most state and 
federal courts remain closely aligned with the Smith Court. It is against this 
backdrop that the Oklahoma Supreme Court decided Starkey, ultimately 
aligning Oklahoma with the minority of states that have departed from the 
Smith decision.   
D. The Statutory Development of Oklahoma’s Sex Offender Regulatory 
Scheme 
To fully understand the Starkey decision, it is necessary to consider not 
just the relevant case law, but also the pertinent statutory provisions and 
their development over time. After 1998, the Oklahoma Legislature enacted 
a series of amendments to the state’s registration act. Two such 
amendments are particularly important to the Starkey decision. In 2004, the 
Oklahoma Legislature passed an amendment “requir[ing] registration to be 
10 years from the date of completion of the sentence,” which was defined 
as “the day an offender completes all incarceration, probation, and parole 
                                                                                                                 
 98. Doe v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety & Corr. Servs., 62 A.3d 123, 143 (Md. 2013); Wallace 
v. State, 905 N.E.2d 371, 384 (Ind. 2009); Doe v. State, 189 P.3d 999, 1006-19 (Alaska 
2008). 
 99. Doe, 189 P.3d at 1006-19. 
 100. Doe, 62 A.3d at 129-30; Wallace, 905 N.E.2d at 384. 
 101. See, e.g., Doe, 62 A.3d at 131. 
 102. See Doe, 189 P.3d at 1004-07. 
 103. Doe, 62 A.3d at 133. 
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pertaining to the sentence.”104 Also significant was a 2007 amendment that 
created a three-tiered risk assessment system, modeled off of federal law, 
which categorized sex offenders in the state based on the danger they posed 
to the community.105 Pursuant to this amendment, the Oklahoma 
Department of Corrections created a committee tasked with developing a 
sex offender screening tool to classify offenders into three groups:  
1. Level One (low): a designated range of points on the sex 
offender screening tool indicating that the person poses a low 
danger to the community and will not likely engage in criminal 
sexual conduct; 
2. Level Two (moderate): a designated range of points on the sex 
offender screening tool indicating that the person poses a 
moderate danger to the community and may continue to engage 
in criminal sexual conduct; and 
3. Level Three (high): a designated range of points on the sex 
offender screening tool indicating that the person poses a serious 
danger to the community and will continue to engage in criminal 
sexual conduct.106 
The proposed screening tool called for a numeric, point-based system in 
which the original offense served as the basis for the minimum risk level.107  
The offender was then assigned points based on a variety of risk factors.108 
In another amendment, the legislature set the registration periods for the 
three levels: a Level One offender must register for fifteen years at the 
conclusion of the sentence, a Level Two offender must register for twenty-
five years, and a Level Three offender or someone classified as a “habitual 
or aggravated sex offender” must register for life.109 The system allowed 
offenders to challenge their risk assessment level, and the DOC committee 
or a court could change the assigned risk level if it did not accurately reflect 
the danger the offender posed to the community.110  
                                                                                                                 
 104. Starkey v. Okla. Dep’t of Corr., 2013 OK 43, ¶ 33, 305 P.3d 1004, 1017 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). Prior to the 2004 amendment, the registration clock began when 
the court imposed the sentence. Id. 
 105. Id. ¶ 4, 305 P.3d at 1010. 
 106. Id. (quoting 57 OKLA. STAT. § 582.5 (Supp. 2007)). 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. ¶ 5, 305 P.3d at 1010.  
 110. Id. ¶ 6, 305 P.3d at 1010. 
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However, subsequent amendments to the registration act in 2009 
abandoned the point-based risk assessment.111 Instead of using a variety of 
factors to classify offenders, the original offense became the sole basis for 
the risk level assigned.112 Additionally, the DOC or a court could only 
increase an offender’s risk level, effectively barring offenders from 
challenging and reducing their risk level assignments.113   
The retroactive application of the 2004 and 2007 amendments was the 
impetus for Starkey’s lawsuit.114 Accordingly, these amendments are 
essential in setting the scene for the Starkey decision. 
III. Starkey v. Oklahoma Department of Corrections 
A. Facts & Procedural Background 
In 1998, James M. Starkey, Sr. pled no contest in Texas district court to a 
charge of sexual assault on a minor child.115 The victim was fifteen years 
old.116 In accepting Starkey’s plea, the Texas trial court entered a deferred 
adjudication requiring that he serve sixty days in county jail, pay a $4000 
fine, pay restitution, perform 320 hours of community service, and be 
placed under community supervision for ten years.117  
Although Starkey’s precise offense under Texas law is unclear, the 
equivalent statute for sexual assault in Oklahoma is “Lewd or Indecent 
Proposals or Acts to Child Under 16,”118 which prohibits a list of 
                                                                                                                 
 111. Id. ¶ 7, 305 P.3d at 1010. In an October 2013 legislative interim study hearing 
discussing Oklahoma’s sex offender classification system, Assistant Attorney General John 
Hadden explained that the individualized risk assessment was scrapped because it would 
require due process hearings for everyone on the registry. Sex Offender Classification and 
Registration: Hearing on Interim Study 13-028 Before the H. Comm. On the Judiciary, 2013 
Leg., 54th Sess. (Okla. 2013), http://okhouse.gov/Documents/InterimStudies/2013/Audio% 
2013-028%2018-8-2013.mp3 (statement of Assistant Attorney General John Hadden at 
1:16:00). 
 112. Starkey, ¶ 7, 305 P.3d at 1010. 
 113. Id. 
 114. See infra Part IV. 
 115. Starkey, ¶ 1, 305 P.3d at 1008.  
 116. Id. However, the court noted that a district court document identified two victims, 
both presumably fifteen years of age. Id. ¶ 1 n.1, 305 P.3d at 1008 n.1.  
 117. Id. ¶ 1, 305 P.3d at 1009. As a condition of his community supervision, Starkey was 
required to register as a sex offender in Texas. Id. 
 118. Id.  
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inappropriate sexual activity involving minors.119 Violation of the statute is 
a felony and punishable by imprisonment of up to twenty years.120 
Starkey moved to Oklahoma in 1998 and registered as a sex offender 
pursuant to the Oklahoma Registration Act.121 Although an amended 
version of the statute went into effect in 1998, both the prior and amended 
versions of the statute provided that the law “shall apply to any person who 
. . . enters this state on or after September 1, 1993, and who has received a 
deferred judgment for a crime or attempted crime which, if committed or 
attempted in this state,” is proscribed by title 21, section 1123 of the 
Oklahoma Statutes.122 The law required any person convicted of a sex 
offense in another jurisdiction on or after November 1, 1989, to register for 
ten years after the commission of the crime.123 Thus, under the 1998 version 
of the registration act, Starkey was required to register as a sex offender in 
Oklahoma for ten years.124 
In 2008, just prior to the end of Starkey’s ten-year registration period, the 
DOC classified Starkey as a Level Three sex offender, extending his 
registration period to life.125 Starkey filed suit in 2009, requesting that the 
district court find that he had served his ten years on the registry, and 
discharge him from any further obligation to register as a sex offender and, 
alternatively, to reduce his risk level to Level One.126  
Starkey filed a motion for summary judgment based on three arguments: 
First, he was not required to register under Oklahoma law at the time of his 
deferred adjudication in Texas.127 Second, the DOC risk assignment 
violated his procedural due process rights because he was denied an 
opportunity to challenge the classification.128 Third, having fulfilled his 
original registration requirement of ten years, the trial court should remove 
him from the state sex offender list.129 In response, the DOC argued that 
Starkey’s procedural due process rights were not violated because no 
hearing was necessary to determine his risk level (as it was based solely on 
                                                                                                                 
 119. 21 OKLA. STAT. § 1123 (Supp. 2013). 
 120. Id. § 1123(A)(5). 
 121. See Starkey, ¶ 2, 305 P.3d at 1009. 
 122. Id. (citing 57 OKLA. STAT. § 582 (Supp. 1998); 57 OKLA. STAT. § 582 (Supp. 1997)). 
 123. Id. ¶ 3, 305 P.3d at 1009. 
 124. Id. ¶ 8, 305 P.3d at 1010. 
 125. Id. The DOC assigned Starkey his risk level without a hearing. Id. 
 126. Id. (noting that Starkey filed his petition “just months before the effective date of the 
2009 amendment extinguishing his right to have his level assignment reduced”). 
 127. Id. ¶ 9, 305 P.3d at 1010-11. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. ¶¶ 8-9, 305 P.3d 1010-11. 
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the original offense and required no other finding of fact).130 The DOC also 
argued a retroactive application of the registration act was not a violation of 
the ex post facto prohibitions of the United States and Oklahoma 
Constitutions, because the intent of the registration act was to create a “civil 
regulatory scheme” rather than impose punishment.131  
Side-stepping the ex post facto issue, the trial court found that the 
registration act should not be retroactively applied to Starkey.132 Further, 
the applicable law was the version of the registration act in effect in 1998, 
which was when Starkey pled no contest to sexually assaulting a minor 
child in Texas.133 Under the 1998 version of the registration act, offenders 
were only required to register for ten years.134 Finding Starkey had fulfilled 
his obligation and should have been removed from the registry sometime in 
2008, the trial court granted his motion for summary judgment on May 10, 
2011.135  
The DOC appealed the trial court’s ruling to the Oklahoma Supreme 
Court and requested “a published opinion establishing binding precedent” 
that the registration act should be applied retroactively and that such 
application does not violate due process or the prohibition against ex post 
facto laws.136 Conversely, Starkey asked that the court find the registration 
act should only be applied prospectively, and, in the alternative, that 
retroactive application of the registration act is a violation of the Ex Post 
Facto Clause.137  
B. Issues on Appeal 
On appeal, and reviewing the trial court’s ruling de novo, the Oklahoma 
Supreme Court considered three issues: (1) whether amendments to the 
registration act should be applied retroactively, (2) whether the registration 
act was punitive, instead of regulatory, and therefore subject to ex post 
facto analysis, and (3) whether amendments to the registration act, as 
applied to Starkey, violated the Ex Post Facto Clause.138 
  
                                                                                                                 
 130. Id. ¶ 14, 305 P.3d at 1012. 
 131. Id. ¶ 15, 305 P.3d at 1012. 
 132. Id. ¶ 16, 305 P.3d at 1013. 
 133. Id.  
 134. Id. ¶ 3, 305 P.3d at 1009. 
 135. Id. ¶ 16, 305 P.3d at 1013.  
 136. Id. ¶ 18, 305 P.3d at 1013. 
 137. Id. 
 138. See id. ¶¶ 17-18, 305 P.3d at 1013.  
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C. Holding  
Affirming in part and reversing in part, the Supreme Court held that (1) 
the level assignment system established in the 2007 amendments applied 
prospectively and did not apply to Starkey, but the 2004 amendment 
requiring offenders to register for ten years after the end of their sentence 
did apply retroactively;139 (2) the registration act was punitive and subject 
to ex post facto analysis;140 and (3) the retroactive application of the 2004 
amendment to Starkey was a violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause of the 
Oklahoma Constitution.141 
IV. Decision and Rationale 
As an initial matter, the court addressed which amendments to the 
registration act should apply retroactively to Starkey. The amendments at 
issue included the 2007 amendment creating three risk levels for offenders, 
as well as the 2004 amendment changing the start of the mandatory 
registration period from the date of conviction to when the offender 
completed his sentence.142  
The court determined the 2007 amendment and its risk-level system 
should not apply retroactively and that the DOC improperly applied it to 
Starkey.143 The court recognized Oklahoma law’s strong presumption 
against retroactive legislation.144 To overcome this presumption, the 
legislature must expressly declare its intent that the legislation apply 
retroactively, or it must be necessarily implied from the statute’s 
language.145 Noting the 2007 amendment’s prospective language, the court 
found the legislature intended the amendment to function prospectively.146 
Consequently, because Starkey committed his offense in 1998—nine years 
                                                                                                                 
 139. Id. ¶¶ 32-33, 305 P.3d at 1016-17. 
 140. Id. ¶¶ 76-77, 305 P.3d at 1030. 
 141. Id. ¶ 81, 305 P.3d at 1031. 
 142. Id. ¶¶ 4, 33, 305 P.3d at 1010, 1017. 
 143. See id. ¶ 82, 305 P.3d at 1031. 
 144. Id. ¶ 23, 305 P.3d at 1014 (citing Wickham v. Gulf Oil Corp., 1981 OK 8, ¶ 14, 623 
P.2d 613, 616-17).  
 145. Id. ¶¶ 23-24, 305 P.3d at 1014 (citing Good v. Keel, 1911 OK 264, ¶ 3, 116 P. 777, 
777-78). 
 146. Id. ¶¶ 29, 32, 305 P.3d at 1015-16. The amendment “appl[ies] the level assignments 
to a person ‘who will be subject to the provisions of the Sex Offenders Registration Act.’” 
Id. (alteration in original). 
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before the amendment took effect—the DOC should not have assigned 
Starkey a risk level.147 
As for the 2004 amendment, the court held that retroactive application 
was implicit in the amendment’s language.148 Unlike the 2007 amendment, 
the 2004 amendment contained no prospective language.149 By altering the 
act’s language so that the ten-year registration period began after 
completion of the sentence, “[t]he Legislature must have known” that the 
change would affect individuals convicted of an offense or who received a 
deferred sentence before 2004.150 Thus, the court determined the 2004 
amendment applied retroactively to Starkey.151 As a practical matter, this 
change doubled Starkey’s registration period—instead of ending in 2008, it 
would end in 2018.152  
Finding the 2004 amendment applied retroactively to Starkey and that 
the DOC retroactively applied the 2007 level system to Starkey, the court 
analyzed whether such retroactive application violated the ex post facto 
prohibition of the Oklahoma Constitution.153 The court began its analysis 
with Article 2 of the Oklahoma Constitution, which provides that “[n]o . . . 
ex post facto law . . . shall ever be passed.”154 The court held that the Ex 
Post Facto Clause is essential to protecting individual liberty and that such a 
restriction on legislative power is necessary to shield the people from 
“those sudden and strong passions to which men are exposed.”155 The court 
noted, however, that the ex post facto prohibition only applies to penal 
laws, and therefore, the decisive question was whether the provisions of the 
registration act are “punitive or . . . merely regulatory.”156 To answer this 
question, the court employed the “intent-effects test” and the Mendoza-
Martinez factors used by the Smith court.157 Applying this test, the court 
considered whether the intent of the legislative body was to enact a punitive 
                                                                                                                 
 147. Id. ¶¶ 28, 82, 305 P.3d at 1015, 1031. 
 148. Id. ¶¶ 33-34, 305 P.3d at 1017. 
 149. Id. Notably, the 2004 provision does not contain any forward-looking language, 
such as “will be.” See, e.g., supra note 146 and accompanying text. 
 150. Id. ¶ 34, 305 P.3d at 1017. 
 151. Id. ¶ 81, 305 P.3d at 1030-31.  
 152. Id. ¶ 33, 305 P.3d at 1017. 
 153. Id. ¶¶ 35-37, 305 P.3d at 1017-18. 
 154. Id. ¶ 37, 305 P.3d at 1018 (alteration in original) (quoting OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 
15). 
 155. Id. ¶ 38, 305 P.3d at 1018-19 (quoting Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 137-
38 (1810)).  
 156. Id. ¶ 39, 305 P.3d at 1019. 
 157. Id. ¶¶ 40-41, 305 P.3d at 1019-20 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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or civil measure and whether the effects of the legislation are so punitive as 
to override any civil intent.158 
The court determined that the Oklahoma legislature’s intent in enacting 
the original registration act was unclear.159 The act ostensibly advanced a 
civil purpose of safeguarding the public from repeat sex offenders by 
allowing law enforcement officers to identify offenders and by alerting the 
public of such offenders.160 Although this purpose pointed to a civil intent, 
the court also found “considerable evidence of a punitive effect.”161 
Therefore, the court concluded the legislative intent was not clearly 
established and proceeded to the second prong of the test.162  
The court found the effects-prong of the test to be dispositive.163 Even 
accepting that the intent of the registration act was civil, the court 
determined that it was so punitive in effect as to outweigh any civil 
intent.164 The court noted that it was not bound to the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
application of the Mendoza-Martinez factors in Smith because Starkey’s 
claim implicated the Oklahoma—not the federal—Constitution.165 
Following similar cases in Alaska and Maryland, the court held that the 
federal constitution created a “floor of constitutional rights” whereas the 
“state constitutions provide[d] the ceiling.”166 Accordingly, the court 
conducted its own independent review of the registration act using the 
seven Mendoza-Martinez factors. 
A. Affirmative Disability or Restraint 
The court found an affirmative disability or restraint for several 
reasons.167 Unlike the registration law at issue in Smith, Oklahoma sex 
offenders must regularly report in-person to local law enforcement.168 
Offenders must report before release from prison, before moving addresses, 
after changing jobs, and after enrolling as a student.169 Offenders entering 
                                                                                                                 
 158. Id. ¶¶ 43-44, 305 P.3d at 1020-21. 
 159. See id. ¶ 44, 305 P.3d at 1020 (“As stated, there is no clear legislative categorization 
that SORA is a civil law.”) 
 160. Id. ¶¶ 42-43, 305 P.3d at 1020. 
 161. Id. ¶ 43, 305 P.3d at 1020. 
 162. Id.  
 163. Id. 
 164. See id. ¶ 77, 305 P.3d at 1030. 
 165. Id. ¶ 45, 305 P.3d at 1021. 
 166. Id. (quoting Daffin v. State, 2011 OK 22, ¶ 45 n.20, 251 P.3d 741, 747 n.20). 
 167. Id. ¶¶ 47-57, 305 P.3d at 1021-25. 
 168. Id. ¶¶ 47-50, 305 P.3d at 1021-22. 
 169. Id. ¶ 48, 305 P.3d at 1022. 
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the state must register if they stay in Oklahoma for longer than five 
consecutive days.170 Additionally, the risk-level system requires level one 
offenders to report annually, level two offenders to report semi-annually, 
and level three offenders to report every ninety days.171 The court likened 
the in-person reporting requirement to the postincarceration supervision of 
parolees.172  
Further, the court noted that the law imposes residency restrictions, 
prohibiting offenders from living within 2000 feet of schools, daycare 
centers, parks, playgrounds, and other areas where children are often 
present.173 Finally, the court stated public disclosure of an offender’s 
personal information subjects him to public stigma and the prospect of 
vigilante reprisal.174 Because the registration act requires offenders to report 
in person, restricts their movements, and subjects them to stigmatization, 
the court concluded it imposes an affirmative disability or restraint.175 
B. Sanctions That Have Historically Been Considered Punishment 
The court found the registration act’s provisions resemble traditional 
forms of punishment in two respects. First, the public dissemination of the 
offender’s photograph and personal information resembles the historical 
punishment of shaming.176 Although the offender’s crime is otherwise 
publicly available, the court noted that the registration act makes a 
substantial amount of personally identifiable information available to the 
public “at any time and for any reason.”177 Moreover, offenders must carry 
driver’s licenses identifying them as sex offenders.178 Given the frequency 
in which people must present their licenses on a daily basis (e.g., to pay 
with a check or credit card, get a job, take out a loan) the label on the 
driver’s license acts as a kind of “scarlet letter,” subjecting the offender to 
shame and ridicule.179 Second, the residency restriction resembles the 
traditional punishment of banishment, because it substantially limits where 
offenders may live, either temporarily or permanently.180  
                                                                                                                 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. ¶ 49, 305 P.3d at 1022-23. 
 173. Id. ¶ 50, 305 P.3d at 1023. 
 174. Id. ¶¶ 53-55, 305 P.3d at 1023-24. 
 175. Id. ¶¶ 47-57, 305 P.3d at 1022-25.  
 176. Id. ¶ 59, 305 P.3d at 1025. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. ¶ 60, 305 P.3d at 1025-26. 
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C. Finding of Scienter 
Because many, but not all, offenses that trigger mandatory registration 
have a scienter element, the court gave this factor little weight in its 
analysis.181  
D. Traditional Aims of Punishment—Deterrence and Retribution 
The court found the registration act promotes both of the traditional aims 
of punishment.182 The registration act promotes deterrence through the 
threat of negative consequences, such as the regular reporting requirement 
and the residency requirement.183 The law promotes retribution because it 
determines who must register based solely on the offense committed, not on 
an individual determination of the risk an offender poses to the 
community.184  
E. Behavior Is Already a Crime 
In a similar vein, the court recognized that the registration act targets 
behavior already criminal and reiterated that its provisions trigger based 
solely on a finding of criminal culpability, not the risk of recidivism.185 
Accordingly, the court found this factor rendered the statute more punitive 
in nature.186  
F. Rational Connection to Nonpunitive Purpose 
The court acknowledged that the registration act advances a nonpunitive 
purpose of protecting public safety from sex offenders.187 The legislature 
included this purpose in the 1997 amendments to the statute, which 
incorporated legislative findings.188  
G. Excessiveness  
Even though the registration act ostensibly advances a nonpunitive 
purpose, the court found that it is excessive in promoting that purpose.189 
The statute does not distinguish between high-risk individuals and those 
                                                                                                                 
 181. Id. ¶ 62, 305 P.3d at 1026-27. 
 182. Id. ¶¶ 63-67, 305 P.3d at 1027-28. 
 183. Id. ¶ 63, 305 P.3d at 1027. 
 184. Id. ¶ 65, 305 P.3d at 1027. 
 185. Id. ¶ 68, 305 P.3d at 1028. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. ¶ 69, 305 P.3d at 1028. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. ¶¶ 70-75, 305 P.3d at 1028-30. 
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who present no threat of recidivism.190 Aside from a few narrow 
exceptions, the statute does not permit offenders to challenge their level of 
classifications or reduce their registration periods.191 Persons classified as 
level three offenders are subject to the statute and all its attendant 
restrictions for life.192 Given these factors, the court concluded the 
registration act was excessive in relation to its nonpunitive purpose.193  
Ultimately, in weighing the Mendoza-Martinez factors, the court found 
that the effects of the registration act are so punitive as to override any civil 
intent.194 However, the court was careful to say the registration act was 
facially valid, but that retroactive changes to the law violated the ex post 
facto prohibition.195 The court held that the legislature can substantially 
extend the registration period and impose onerous burdens on sex offenders 
as part of their sentences, so long as it does so prospectively.196 The court 
called the retroactive extension of the registration period “mov[ing] the 
finish line,” without a hearing or any evidence that the offender posed an 
increased threat to the community.197 Based on these findings, the court 
concluded that the retroactive extension of Starkey’s registration period 
violated the ex post facto prohibition of the Oklahoma Constitution.198  
V. Post-Starkey Implications and Opportunities 
A. Starkey Removes Hundreds, if Not Thousands, of Sex Offenders from the 
Registry and May Signal Greater Scrutiny of State Sex Offender Laws 
  
The immediate effects of the Starkey ruling have been swift and 
significant. Oklahoma sex offenders are able to remove their names from 
the registry after the Legislature retroactively extended their registration 
periods. Estimates vary, but anywhere from hundreds to 3000 sex offenders 
may be eligible for relief under Starkey.199 As of June 26, 2013, there were 
                                                                                                                 
 190. Id. ¶ 75, 305 P.3d at 1030. 
 191. Id. ¶ 72, 305 P.3d at 1029. 
 192. Id. ¶ 73, 305 P.3d at 1029. 
 193. Id. ¶ 75, 305 P.3d at 1030. 
 194. Id. ¶ 77, 305 P.3d at 1030.  
 195. Id. ¶¶ 78-79, 305 P.3d at 1030. 
 196. See id. ¶ 79, 305 P.3d at 1030.  
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. ¶¶ 76-79, 305 P.3d at 1030. 
 199.  Randy Ellis, Ramifications of Oklahoma State Supreme Court Sex Offender Ruling Is 
Still Unfurling, NEWSOK.COM (July 1, 2013), http://newsok.com/ramifications-of-oklahoma-
state-supreme-court-sex-offender-ruling-is-still-unfurling/article/3857878. 
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7704 names on the Oklahoma sex offender list.200 Thus, almost half the 
state’s registered sex offenders may be removed from the registry because 
of the decision. This substantial number of offenders raises potential public 
safety concerns in allowing the offenders to go unmonitored. But for those 
offenders affected, the decision represents a significant victory. 
The Starkey decision has also sparked a series of subsequent rulings 
limiting the operation of the state’s sex offender legislation.201 Notably, in 
Osburn v. Oklahoma Department of Corrections, the Oklahoma Supreme 
Court ordered a man convicted of indecent exposure to be removed from 
the sex offender registry because at the time of his conviction, indecent 
exposure did not trigger mandatory registration.202 Reiterating Starkey, the 
court held that the provisions of the registration act and its numerous 
amendments have a punitive effect that outweighs their nonpunitive 
purpose.203 The court determined that retroactive application of the 
registration act to new types of offenses violates the Oklahoma 
Constitution’s Ex Post Facto Clause.204 Osburn is significant in that it 
further limits the legislature’s ability to retroactively expand the scope of 
the registration act.  
Additionally, the Oklahoma Supreme Court’s decision in Hendricks v. 
Jones ex rel. State ex. rel. Oklahoma Department of Corrections suggests 
the court may be willing to more closely scrutinize sex offender laws 
generally, not just on ex post facto grounds.205 In Hendricks, the court held 
as unconstitutional an amendment to the registration act that required 
offenders entering the state to register for offenses committed before 
November 1, 1989 but that did not require Oklahoma offenders to do so.206 
The court held this distinction was arbitrary and violated the Equal 
                                                                                                                 
 200. Randy Ellis, Oklahoma Supreme Court Ruling May Result in Removal of Hundreds of 
Names from Sex Offender Registry, NEWSOK.COM (June 26, 2013), http://newsok.com/okla 
homa-supreme-court-ruling-may-result-in-removal-of-hundreds-of-names-from-sex-offender-
registry/article/3856402. 
 201. See Cerniglia v. Okla. Dep’t of Corr., 2013 OK 81, ¶¶ 4-7, No. 109568, 2013 WL 
5470632, at *2 (reiterating that the risk-level system must be applied prospectively and 
female defendant’s level assignment must therefore be overturned); see also Bollin v. Jones 
ex rel. State ex rel. Okla. Dep’t of Corr., 2013 OK 72, ¶¶ 15-16, No. 108819, 2013 WL 
5204134, at *5; Luster v. State ex rel. Dep’t of Corr., 2013 OK 97, ¶¶ 14-17, 315 P.3d 386, 
390-91; Osburn v. Okla. Dep’t of Corr., 2013 OK 89, ¶ 11, 313 P.3d 926, 929-30.   
 202. Osburn, ¶¶ 1, 11, 313 P.3d at 927, 930. 
 203. Id. ¶ 11, 313 P.3d at 929. 
 204. See id. 
 205. 2013 OK 71, ¶ 17, No. 108797, 2013 WL 5201235, at *5.  
 206. Id. ¶¶ 14-15, 2013 WL 5201235, at *4. 
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Protection Clauses of the Oklahoma and federal constitutions under a 
rational basis review.207  
The recent spike in sex-offender-related cases indicates the Oklahoma 
Supreme Court may be increasingly skeptical of the state’s sex offender 
regulations. Before the Starkey decision, the court had heard a total of ten 
cases involving sex offenders.208 In the six months after Starkey, the court 
had already ruled in eight such cases, and in those cases, it uniformly ruled 
in favor of sex-offender plaintiffs.209 Therefore, one immediate 
consequence of the Starkey decision appears to be greater judicial scrutiny 
of the state’s sex offender legislation and the likelihood of future litigation. 
B. Starkey Opens the Door to Eighth Amendment Challenges of the 
Registration Act, Particularly for Juvenile Offenders  
Indeed, Starkey may unlock future constitutional challenges to the 
registration act on Eighth Amendment grounds, though Oklahoma’s Eighth 
Amendment jurisprudence indicates that such claims may not be successful. 
Previously, such a challenge would have necessarily failed in Oklahoma 
because sex offender registration requirements (as well as residency and 
occupational restrictions and other measures) were considered regulatory 
and nonpunitive.210 This is because in order for punishment to be “cruel and 
unusual,” it must first be punishment.211  
Many states have quickly disposed of sex offenders’ challenges along 
these lines for the same reason they have denied ex post facto claims.212 For 
                                                                                                                 
 207. Id. 
 208. In re Adoption of G.D.J., 2011 OK 77, 261 P.3d 1159; In re A.L.F., 2010 OK 59, 
237 P.3d 217; Skrapka v. Bonner, 2008 OK 30, 187 P.3d 202; In re Adoption of M.J.S., 
2007 OK 44, 162 P.3d 211; In re M.B., 2006 OK 63, 145 P.3d 1040; In re Baby Girl L., 
2002 OK 9, 51 P.3d 544; S.W. v. Duncan, 2001 OK 39, 24 P.3d 846; Towne v. Hubbard, 
2000 OK 30, 3 P.3d 154; Transp. Inf. Servs. v. State ex rel. Okla. Dept. of Corr., 1998 OK 
108, 970 P.2d 166. 
 209. See Bollin v. Jones ex rel. State ex rel. Okla. Dep’t of Corr., 2013 OK 72, ¶ 16, No. 
108819, 2013 WL 5204134, at *5; Burk v. State ex rel. Dep’t of Corr., 2013 OK 80, ¶¶ 11-
12, No. 108301, 2013 WL 5476403, at *2; Butler v. Jones ex rel. State ex rel. Okla. Dep’t of 
Corr., 2013 OK 105, ¶ 17, 321 P.3d 161, 168; Cerniglia v. Okla. Dep’t of Corr., 2013 OK 
81, ¶ 7, No. 109568, 2013 WL 5470623, at *2; Hendricks v. Jones ex rel. State ex rel. Okla. 
Dep’t of Corr., 2013 OK 71, ¶ 17, No. 108797, 2013 WL 5201235, at *5; Luster v. State ex 
rel. Dep’t of Corr., 2013 OK 97, ¶ 17, 315 P.3d 386, 391; Ransdell v. State ex rel. Okla. 
Dep’t of Corr., 2013 OK 106, ¶ 1, 322 P.3d 1064, 1064.  
 210. See supra Part II.3.B.  
 211. See Rainer v. State, 690 S.E.2d 827, 828 (Ga. 2010).  
 212. See, e.g., id. at 829; accord State v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct. (In re Logan D.), 306 P.3d 
369, 388 (Nev. 2013). 
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instance, in Rainer v. State, the Georgia Supreme Court held that “[i]n light 
of this determination that such registry requirements are not punitive, it 
follows that the [registry requirement under Georgia] law is not a cruel and 
unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment.”213 The Georgia 
court also noted that “factors used in determining whether law is 
punishment for ex post facto purposes have their earlier origins in cases 
under the Sixth and Eighth Amendments.”214 In holding that the registration 
act is punitive, Starkey allows Oklahoma courts to conduct a substantive 
inquiry as to whether the state’s sex offender laws impose cruel and unusual 
punishment.  
Whether such an Eighth Amendment challenge could succeed, however, 
is unclear. Although Oklahoma’s cruel and unusual punishment 
jurisprudence is scant, in Malicoat v. State, the Oklahoma Court of 
Criminal Appeals identified several factors courts consider when deciding 
Eighth Amendment challenges. These factors include whether the 
punishment is “proportionate to the offense, offends contemporary 
standards of decency, . . . has legitimate punishment objectives[,]” and 
avoids “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.”215 
In light of these factors, challenging sex offender registration laws on 
cruel and unusual punishment grounds is problematic for several reasons. 
First, sex offenders are naturally unsympathetic and often among the most 
vilified classes of people in society.216 A cruel and unusual punishment 
inquiry is fundamentally a proportionality test, asking whether the 
punishment fits the crime.217 As such, the principal question is whether the 
punishment is grossly excessive compared to the severity of the offense.218 
Some have argued that community notification provisions provoke vigilante 
                                                                                                                 
 213. Rainer, 690 S.E.2d at 828 (alterations in original) (citations omitted) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  
 214. Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 215. Malicoat v. State, 2006 OK CR 25, ¶ 6, 137 P.3d 1234, 1236-37.  
 216. Heather Ellis Cucolo & Michael L. Perlin, Preventing Sex-Offender Recidivism 
Through Therapeutic Jurisprudence Approaches and Specialized Community Integration, 22 
TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 1, 2 (2012).  
 217. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 59 (2010) (noting the prohibition against cruel and 
unusual punishment includes a “narrow” proportionality standard). 
 218. Id. In contrast, in the ex post facto analysis, the excessiveness of the law in relation 
to its nonpunitive purpose is but one factor among many in deciding whether the law is 
punitive in nature. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963).   
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violence, which may constitute cruel and unusual punishment.219 However, 
courts have repeatedly found that the public has a compelling interest in 
implementing sex offender registration laws.220 
For example, in State v. Mossman, the Kansas Supreme Court rejected a 
sex offender’s Eighth Amendment challenge, holding that lifetime 
postrelease supervision of sex offenders advanced “legitimate penological 
goals such as deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation.”221 The 
Mossman court found that society has “a penological interest in punishing 
those who commit sex offenses against minors because they present a 
special problem and danger to society and their actions produce particularly 
devastating effects on victims, including physical and psychological 
harm.”222 The court also noted the “grave concerns over the high rate of 
recidivism among convicted sex offenders and their dangerousness as a 
class.”223 Although these concerns have relatively little empirical 
support,224 persistent popular fears about recidivism will likely hinder cruel 
and unusual challenges to registration laws.  
The general implausibility of Eighth Amendment challenges aside, one 
context in which Oklahoma courts may entertain a cruel and unusual 
challenge to the registration act is in the case of juvenile sex offenders—
and they would not be the first courts to do so. In a largely unprecedented 
decision, the Ohio Supreme Court held in In re C.P. that lifelong 
registration and notification requirements on juvenile sex offenders tried in 
juvenile court were cruel and unusual, and in violation of the Ohio 
                                                                                                                 
 219. See Alex B. Eyssen, Comment, Does Community Notification for Sex Offenders 
Violate the Eighth Amendment's Prohibition Against Cruel and Unusual Punishment? A 
Focus on Vigilantism Resulting from “Megan's Law”, 33 ST. MARY'S L.J. 101, 131 (2001). 
 220. See, e.g., Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 97-99 (2003).  
 221. 281 P.3d 153, 161 (Kan. 2012). Although the plaintiff in Mossman was sentenced to 
lifetime post-release supervision, others have noted the similarities between supervision and 
mandatory registration. See Catherine L. Carpenter & Amy E. Beverlin, The Evolution of 
Unconstitutionality in Sex Offender Registration Laws, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 1071, 1116 (2012). 
 222. Mossman, 281 P.3d at 160 (quoting State v. Wade, 757 N.W.2d 618, 626 (Iowa 
2008)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 223. Id. 
 224. See, e.g., Jill S. Levenson & Leo P. Cotter, The Effect of Megan's Law on Sex 
Offender Reintegration, 21 J. CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 49, 50 (2005) (“[R]ecent studies have 
found that sexual offense recidivism rates are lower than commonly believed.” (citing R.K. 
Hanson & M.T. Bussiere, Predicting Relapse: A Meta-Analysis of Sexual Offender 
Recidivism Studies, 66 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 348, 348-62 (1998); Patrick A. 
Langan et al., Recidivism of Sex Offenders Released from Prison in 1994, BUREAU JUST. 
STAT. 1, 34 (2003)).  
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Constitution.225 In analyzing the proportionality of lifetime registration, the 
Ohio court focused on the profound impact of registration on juvenile 
offenders.226 
The court also found that registration requirements prevent juvenile 
offenders from reentering society as productive members of the community, 
because they enter the workforce with a publicized label of “sex offender,” 
which precludes employment in education, health care, or the military.227 
As one Nevada Supreme Court justice noted, juvenile sex offenders have 
substantially lower recidivism rates compared to adult offenders and are 
more likely to respond to counseling and other forms of treatment than 
adults.228 These findings are supported by empirical studies finding juvenile 
offenders pose little risk of recidivism.229  
By classifying Oklahoma’s registration act as a form of punishment, the 
Oklahoma Supreme Court has opened the door to Eighth Amendment 
challenges to the state’s sex offender laws. Although such challenges are 
generally unlikely to succeed, Oklahoma courts might entertain them in the 
context of juvenile offenders given the public policy interests at stake.  
C. Starkey Provides an Opportunity for Sounder Sex Offender Policies  
In addition to opening up possible legal challenges, Starkey greatly limits 
the Oklahoma Legislature’s ability to pass retroactive amendments to the 
state’s registration act. As a practical matter, however, the ruling does 
nothing to prevent the Legislature from extending registration periods or 
imposing additional restrictions on sex offenders so long as those 
provisions apply prospectively. But this option may be undesirable to 
                                                                                                                 
 225. In re C.P., 131 Ohio St. 3d 513, 2012-Ohio-1446, 967 N.E.2d 729, ¶¶ 25-29.  
 226. Id. ¶¶ 44-46 (“For juveniles, the length of the punishment is extraordinary, and it is 
imposed at an age at which the character of the offender is not yet fixed. . . . For a juvenile 
offender, the stigma of the label of sex offender attaches at the start of his adult life and 
cannot be shaken. . . . While not a harsh penalty to a career criminal used to serving time in a 
penitentiary, a lifetime or even 25-year requirement of community notification means 
everything to a juvenile. It will define his adult life before it has a chance to truly begin.”). 
 227. Id. ¶ 55 (citing Phoebe Geer, Justice Served? The High Cost of Juvenile Sex 
Offender Registration, 27 DEV. MENTAL HEALTH L. 33, 48-49 (2008)). 
 228. See State v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct. (In re Logan D.), 306 P.3d 369, 391-92 (Nev. 
2013) (Cherry, J., dissenting). 
 229. See Franklin E. Zimring et al., Sexual Delinquency in Racine: Does Early Sex 
Offending Predict Later Sex Offending in Youth and Young Adulthood?, 6 CRIMINOLOGY & 
PUB. POL’Y 507, 511-12, 529 (2007) (arguing fears of juvenile sex offender recidivism are 
exaggerated). 
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policymakers who want a comprehensive regulatory scheme that gives 
amendments retroactive effect.  
One possible solution is to incorporate an individualized risk assessment 
into the statute as envisioned by the original drafters of the 2007 
amendment, which created the risk-level categories. Rather than base the 
registration period solely on the criminal offense, each offender’s 
registration duties would be based on a scientific determination of his risk 
to society. Moreover, the statute could provide opportunities for sex 
offenders to present evidence of rehabilitation in order to be removed from 
the registry. Such a solution would address many of the Starkey court’s 
concerns regarding the third and seventh Mendoza-Martinez factors 
(retribution and excessiveness to nonpunitive purpose). To pass judicial 
muster, some have argued that legislatures must unpack their sex offender 
regulatory schemes so that they more reasonably advance the goals of 
promoting public safety.230 Such efforts may entail dramatically scaling 
back burdens on sex offenders who pose little real threat to the 
community.231 Granted, those efforts would undoubtedly face stiff public 
opposition, given societal opinions of sex offenders.  
Nevertheless, Starkey provides an opportunity for state lawmakers to 
create a more effective and just sex offender regulatory scheme based not 
on unsubstantiated fear, but instead on scientific evidence. Recent 
developments suggest that lawmakers may be attempting to do just that. 
Lawmakers in the Oklahoma House of Representatives met in October of 
2013 to conduct an inquiry into the state’s registration system to determine 
whether it is, in fact, protecting the public.232 There appears to be growing 
concern among law enforcement and lawmakers that the state’s offense-
based level system wastes police resources on registrants who pose little 
threat to the community.233 The legislature has yet to act, however, to 
meaningfully improve the state’s sex offender laws in the wake of the 
Starkey decision. 
                                                                                                                 
 230. See Carpenter & Beverlin, supra note 221, at 1117-22 (arguing that “excessive 
legislation” renders registration schemes overly broad and ineffective in advancing 
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D. Revisiting Smith and Why Other States Should Follow Starkey’s Lead  
In terms of judicial reform, overturning Smith may be unnecessary. The 
efforts of a minority of states (now including Oklahoma), demonstrate that 
states may avoid Smith’s effect by overruling retroactive amendments on 
state-law grounds or by distinguishing the facts in Smith from today’s more 
onerous registration schemes.234 The residency restriction is perhaps the 
most striking distinction. Courts ought to adopt a more realistic 
appreciation of the residency restriction’s effects and its similarity to the 
traditional punishment of banishment. Expanded residency restrictions 
effectively “freeze out” offenders from huge swaths of inhabited 
communities.235 A study in Oklahoma City, for instance, determined that 
the 2000-foot protected zone around schools, playgrounds, parks and 
childcare facilities left less than sixteen percent of the city legally 
inhabitable by sex offenders.236 Some have argued that residency 
restrictions actually increase recidivism by removing offenders from family 
and other support systems.237 Given the considerable burden that residency 
restrictions impose, a more honest application of the intent-effects analysis 
should lead courts to arrive at decisions similar to Starkey.  
VI. Conclusion 
The Starkey decision dramatically alters the operation of sex offender 
legislation in Oklahoma and places Oklahoma in the same camp as a 
minority of states that have found retroactive amendments to registration 
laws unconstitutional on ex post facto grounds. The decision correctly 
identifies the significant burdens that Oklahoma’s current registration act 
imposes on sex offenders and the stark absence of individualized risk 
assessment for sex offenders. Although some lawmakers may see the 
decision as a set back to their regulatory aims, the ruling provides an 
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opportunity for enacting a more effective and just regulatory scheme. 
Moreover, the decision provides a model for other states with similar 
registration laws to emulate. For these reasons, the Starkey decision is a 
significant development in Oklahoma’s ex post facto jurisprudence. 
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